



A PUBLIC POLICY TOOL?
Nick Davis
ABSTRACT
This paper is a primer for policy analysts on the securitisation of assets and liabilities.
It describes key elements of a typical asset securitisation; outlines the reasons for
securitising assets; discusses the types of assets that can be securitised; describes the
requirements for a successful asset securitisation; examines whether New Zealand's
financial infrastructure presents any barriers to securitisation; discusses the issues
surrounding the securitisation of liabilities; and analyses the potential public policy uses
of securitisation.  The paper does not aim to review sovereign securitisations that have
occurred to date.
The potential public policy benefits include more efficient financing, improved balance
sheet structure, better risk management and improved fiscal credibility.  However, the
Crown's low borrowing costs and diversity of financial exposures limits the extent to
which benefits are achievable and measurable.  There is scope for securitisation to
enhance fiscal credibility, particularly in the area of superannuation where policy
credibility is a key determinant of a successful policy outcome.
An appendix to the paper examines the costs and benefits of securitising the Crown's
student loans portfolio.  It concludes that further work could be done to quantify the
costs and benefits but notes that the benefits would have to be significant in light of the
additional costs associated with securitisation.
Disclaimer: The views expressed are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect those of the New Zealand Treasury.  The Treasury
takes no responsibility for any errors or omissions in, or for the
correctness of, the information contained in this working paper.2
1 What is Securitisation?
Securitisation is “the issuance of marketable securities backed not by the
expected capacity to repay of a private corporation or public sector entity, but by
the expected cash flows from specific assets”  [OECD (1995)].  The concept of
securitisation is best understood by considering a typical transaction.  The
glossary below provides definitions for those unfamiliar with the jargon.
In a securitisation, the originator sells receivables to a special purpose
vehicle (SPV) established to isolate the receivables and to perform other
functions (eg, restructuring of cash flows and provision of credit enhancement
and liquidity support).  The SPV is usually structured as a bankruptcy-remote
trust or incorporated entity.
The SPV finances the purchase of receivables by issuing securities (usually
notes, commercial paper, bills, bonds, or preferred stock) to investors.  Legal
agreements delineate the rights and obligations of all parties to the transaction,
including the appointment of an administrator to manage the receivables where
necessary.
One or more financial institutions are usually involved in structuring and
marketing the securities issued by the SPV.  To facilitate investor demand,
credit rating agencies assess the likelihood that the SPV will default on its
obligations and assign an appropriate credit rating.  Credit enhancement and















Glossary of Securitisation Terms
Obligor:  An obligor is a customer of the originator who is obliged to pay on a
contractual basis for goods or services provided by the originator (eg, a trade
debtor or a home loan borrower).
Originator:  The seller of assets, called the originator, transfers ownership of
the assets to the SPV and usually continues to service the assets in exchange
for a management fee.
Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV): When receivables are securitised their
ownership is transferred to an SPV.  SPVs usually take the form of a bankruptcy
remote trust or incorporated entity.  In both cases, the appointed trustees or the
board of directors have a fiduciary duty to protect the interests of investors.
Bankruptcy remote: If an SPV is bankruptcy remote it has legal protection
against claims arising from the bankruptcy of the originator, limiting the credit
risk faced by investors to the assets of the SPV.
Investors:  Investors, usually institutions, purchase securities issued by the
SPV.  The securities are usually rated by external credit agencies and take the
form of notes, commercial paper, bills, bonds or preferred stock.
Credit Enhancement: Credit enhancement usually consists of third-party
guarantees, subordinated debt, over-collateralisation, or cash deposit.  The
provision of credit enhancement protects investors against the prospect of
losses resulting from the securitised assets.
Over-collateralisation: The holding of assets of greater value than is needed
to support contractual payments, so that the investor is protected in the event of
a shortfall in expected payments.
Liquidity Support: Liquidity support is provided to a SPV to assist meeting
payments to investors in the event of there being insufficient cash flow from the
receivables.  This service is usually provided by a financial institution, such as a
bank, and is required by credit rating agencies and investors.
Off Balance Sheet Sale Treatment: Securitisation transactions may be
structured such that the assets are removed from the originators' balance sheet
for accounting and regulatory purposes.
Rated Securities: A financial instrument, usually a debt security, that has been
assigned a rating of default risk by one or more credit rating agencies.4
2 Why securitise assets?
The potential benefits of securitisation to the originator are:
·  more efficient financing
For some private-sector institutions, securitisation is used to lower the firm's
weighted-average cost of capital.  This is possible because equity capital is no
longer required to support the assets and highly rated debt can be issued into
deep capital markets with investor demand driving down financing costs.
·  improved balance sheet structure
Securitisation can enhance managerial control over the size and structure of a
firm's balance sheet.  For example, accounting de-recognition of assets (ie,
removal from the balance sheet) can improve gearing ratios as well as other
measures of economic performance (eg, Return on Equity).  Financial
institutions use securitisation to achieve capital adequacy targets, particularly
where assets have become impaired
1.
Securitisation also releases capital for other investment opportunities.  This may
generate economic gains if external borrowing sources are constrained, or if
there are differences between internal and external financing costs.
·  better risk management
Securitisation often reduces funding risk by diversifying funding sources.
Financial institutions also use securitisation to eliminate interest rate
mismatches.  For example, banks can offer long-term fixed rate financing
without significant risk, by passing the interest rate and other market risk to
investors seeking long-term fixed rate assets. Securitisation has also been used
successfully to give effect to sales of impaired assets.
Securitisation also benefits investors.  It enables them to make their investment
decisions independently of the credit-standing of the originator, and instead to
focus on the degree of protection provided by the structure of the SPV and the
capacity of securitised assets to meet the promised principal and interest
payments.
Securitisation also creates more complete markets by introducing new
categories of financial assets that suit investors risk preferences and by
increasing the potential for investors to achieve diversification benefits.  By
meeting the needs of different 'market segments', securitisation transactions
can generate gains for both originators and investors.
                                           
1 An impaired asset is one that is currently in default or is returning well below the original yield
promised by the asset.5
3 What types of assets can be securitised?
Any type of asset with a reasonably predictable stream of future cash flows can
be securitised.  The assets that are easiest to securitise are those: that occur in
large pools; for which past experience can be used to predict default rates; for
which documentation is standardised; and for which ownership is transferable.
Residential mortgages are the most commonly securitised asset.  The US
market in Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) is huge with some 55-60
percent of total United States residential mortgages now securitised.  Recent
market innovations include Collateralised Mortgage Obligations (CMOs)
which provide investors with an improved capacity to deal with pre-payment
risk.  In the United States, MBS issues are government guaranteed and, hence,
are classified as a form of government paper [OECD (1995)].
In view of the success of the MBS market, financial institutions began
experimenting with securitisation of other assets.  Asset Backed Securities
(ABS) is the catch-all nomenclature used to describe non-mortgage-backed
securitisations.  The most widely used collateral for ABS are credit card
receivables, automobile loans, commercial mortgages (single properties and
pools), leases and trade receivables.  The outstanding volume of publicly traded
ABS in the United States was recently estimated at $200 billion [OECD (1995)].
In the Australasian market, during 1998, Standard and Poors assigned ratings
to A$21.9 billion of MBS and ABS supported by Australian and New Zealand
assets.  A total of A$46.8 billion of rated securities remained outstanding at the
end of 1998.  Of these, 56% were backed by residential mortgage pools; 21%
by financial securities; 9% by corporate receivables, with the rest backed by a
mix of corporate loans, commercial property, credit card and trade receivables
[Standard and Poors (1999)].6
4 What is required for a successful asset securitisation?
Two conditions are required for a successful securitisation:
(i)  a robust financial infrastructure, which enables the efficient transfer of
assets from the originator to the SPV while protecting the interests of
investors; and
(ii)  strong investor demand, which facilitates lower financing costs for the
originator.  The level of investor demand will depend inter alia on the risk
characteristics of the securities on offer, and on the credit rating assigned
by the ratings agencies.
4.1  Characteristics of a Robust Financial Infrastructure
A country's financial infrastructure comprises the legal environment, the
accounting environment, the regulatory environment, the taxation environment,
and back-office systems.  A robust financial infrastructure facilitates
securitisation transactions by not imposing significant compliance or
administrative costs on the originator, while also providing adequate protection
to investors.  The following sub-sections discuss the characteristics required for
a robust financial infrastructure.  The New Zealand environment is assessed
against these characteristics in section five.
4.1.1  The Legal Environment
The legal status of an SPV is closely tied to the concept of a “trust”.  Through a
trust, the ownership (i.e., legal title) in certain assets can be transferred to one
or more trustees who are obligated under the terms of the trust agreement to
manage the assets for the benefit of one or more beneficiaries.  A key question
in assessing whether the legal environment is conducive to securitisation is to
determine whether the ownership of receivables can be transferred efficiently.
Even where the law allows transfers of title, some legal environments (eg, Italy)
require that debtors be given the power to veto sales of receivables, or may
require that debtors be formally notified.  In some cases, notification of all
debtors may be impractical.  There may also be debtor privacy and consumer
protection issues.  In cases where existing laws prevent transfer of ownership, it
may be possible to modify future contracts to allow receivables to be bought
and sold.
Legal criteria determining whether a “true sale” has occurred differ between
jurisdictions.  Most legal systems make a distinction between the “sale” of
assets and the “financing” of assets.  Legal systems may not recognise the
“bankruptcy remote” status of an SPV, or may not give investors sufficient
protection in the case of delinquency by the debtors.  There may also be
uncertainties relating to the protection accorded the investor in the event of
insolvency of the servicer.7
4.1.2  The Accounting Environment
In the private sector, some of the benefits of securitisation (eg, improved
balance sheet structure) require off-balance sheet treatment of the
securitisation transactions.  The most important accounting question, therefore,
is whether the assets being securitised qualify for de-recognition for financial
reporting purposes.
Achieving de-recognition requires the securitisation transaction to be treated as
a sale rather than a financing transaction.  The distinction is subtle and depends
on the extent to which the originator relinquishes claims over the assets as well
as the degree of recourse to the originator in the event of failure of the SPV
2.
Accounting practices can differ in the way in which residual liabilities are valued
and reported.  Similarly, accounting treatment can vary with regard to the
valuation of interests in collateral that have been removed from the balance
sheet but which continue to produce earnings.  Other accounting issues include
the way in which the positions of originators (or servicers) are reported on
balance-sheets, and the way in which originators' account for interests in
subordinated tranches.
4.1.3  The Regulatory Environment
The regulatory environment consists of an array of laws and regulations relating
to, but not limited to, company formation and governance, trust establishment
and the fiduciary duties of trustees, financial reporting requirements, and
securities law.  While regulatory environments differ substantially between
jurisdictions, most regimes involve a combination of information disclosure
requirements, the imposition of fiduciary duties on trustees and board directors,
and the application of capital adequacy and solvency rules.
In some jurisdictions, the regulatory environment (particularly relating to banks)
presents significant impediments to securitisation through either outright
prevention or the imposition of high compliance costs.  In recent times,
however, there has been a trend in financial market regulation towards less
stringent controls and a greater reliance on information disclosure and
competition as a means of protecting investors.  The cost of complying with
regulatory requirements is likely to be a key determinant of the success of
securitisation transactions.
4.1.4  The Taxation Environment
In the private sector, issues of taxation can be highly significant.  Some
jurisdictions levy taxes on the transfer of assets and on cash flows (eg,
payments by obligors into the SPV or payments by the SPV to investors).
Taxes may also be imposed on profits earned by investments inside the SPV.
                                           
2 This issue is similar to the legal issue of determining whether a “true sale” of receivables has
occurred.8
Taxes may make securitisation uneconomic compared to other financing
instruments.
Taxation issues are largely irrelevant when securitisations are undertaken by a
government since tax paid remains within the public-sector.  However, taxation
may add costs to the securitisation process if governments conduct their
securitisation activities offshore.  Offshore securitisations are often used by
private firms to get around impediments posed by the domestic regulatory and
accounting environments.
4.1.5  Back-office Systems
A final issue of financial infrastructure is the adequacy of documentation and
"back-office” systems to support securitisation.  The terms of receivables and
the documentation supporting them must be sufficiently standardised to permit
the assembly of pools of homogeneous assets.  There have been examples of
practices in various countries that do not meet this criteria, particularly in
respect of residential mortgages, commercial real estate loans, and consumer
loans.
If considerable effort is required to study each proposed receivable sale in
detail, pooling receivables from different originators may not be feasible.
Furthermore, it is important to be able to monitor payments, identify
delinquencies, and establish standard procedures to deal with delinquency if
investors are to purchase assets with reliable cash flows.  Credible histories of
payments on specific categories of assets are also needed.
4.2  Factors Contributing to Strong Investor Demand
A key determinant of the economic benefits from securitisation is the extent to
which the market is “issuer driven” or “investor pulled”.  Key determinants of
investor demand include the expected risk and return characteristics of the
security on offer, the degree of protection provided by the structure of the SPV,
and the credit rating assigned to the securities by the ratings agencies.
Since investors in asset-backed securities have no recourse to the originator, it
is important to ensure that:
·  receivables are sufficient to meet the payments promised by the SPV;
·  safeguards exist to provide for shortfalls in cash from receivables; and
·  investors have clear legal claims on the income from receivables and have
adequate protection in the case of delinquency.
Two major developments have arisen to facilitate the reduction and assessment
of credit risk: the use of credit enhancement and a greater role for the credit-
rating agencies.9
4.2.1  Credit Enhancement
Credit enhancement provides a degree of protection to investors against losses
resulting from the underlying portfolio of assets.  A number of different forms of
credit enhancement exist:
·  Third party guarantees - an external party, often an insurance company or
a bank, provides a guarantee over the debt issued by the SPV.  A number
of specialised companies called “monoline insurers” have emerged.  Their
sole function is to offer credit enhancement for fees.  The guarantee can
be for 100 percent of payments (called “wraparound”) or for some lesser
amount;
·  Subordinated debt - by creating a “senior/subordinated” structure, the SPV
can provide for investors with preferences for differing levels of credit
protection.  Essentially, some creditors agree to grant priority to other
creditors in exchange for higher rates of return.  One possibility is for the
originator to retain a subordinated tranche but this may create legal and
regulatory difficulties in terms of determining whether or not a “true sale” of
receivables has occurred.  Assets securitised in this way may not qualify
for off-balance-sheet treatment.  Subordinated tranches will often be
assigned lower credit ratings than senior tranches.  In some cases,
subordinated tranches of securities can be privately placed while the
senior tranches are offered publicly.
·  Over-collateralisation - the assets put into the pool can be of greater value
than is needed to support the contractual payments, so that the investor is
protected in the event of a shortfall in expected payments.  The excess
collateral is often held in a subordinated tranche or special account.
·  Cash collateral accounts - a cash deposit can be held in a special account
that can be used for payments in the event of a shortfall in cash from
receivables.  A slight variation is the “spread account”, which represents
the difference between the margin received by the originator and that of
the investor.  The originator will receive payment from the spread account
once the other creditors have been paid in full.  Cash collateral or spread
accounts can be used in conjunction with a senior/subordinated structure.
4.2.2  The Role of the Credit Rating Agencies
A central role for providing investors with assurances about credit risk has
devolved to the credit rating agencies.  Prior to each issuance of securities, one
or more credit ratings agencies examine the receivables, additional collateral
3,
proposed securities, and the structure of the SPV, and assign a rating to the
                                           
3 The rating agencies usually apply the "weak link" principle when assessing externally provided
credit enhancements, meaning that the rating of a security can be no higher than the rating of
an external provider of enhancements.10
securities as an indication of their creditworthiness.  The investor must devise
other methods of assessing non-credit risks, such as interest rate, exchange
rate, and prepayment risk.
The rating agencies examine the historical performance of the receivables and
perform “stress testing” on the underlying cash flows.  For example, the
historical rates of delinquency on receivables will be analysed and simulations
undertaken to determine the impact on the portfolio of an extremely
unfavourable event, such as the worst sustained period of poor performance in
recent history.  Based on this analysis, the ratings agencies will indicate the
amount of credit enhancement that is required to achieve a desired rating.
Negotiations take place between the investment banks and the ratings agencies
regarding hypothetical structures and their associated ratings.
The ratings agencies will also look at internal mechanisms for transforming cash
flows, whether adequate information systems are in place to accurately track
payments and to identify delinquencies, as well as processes for dealing with
delinquent payments.11
5 Does New Zealand Have a Robust Financial Infrastructure?
In New Zealand, no real impediments exist from a legal, regulatory, tax, or
accounting perspective.  In fact, the regulatory environment has meant that
existing securitisation models from the US and UK have been easily adapted for
use in New Zealand.
Two constraints do exist, however.  First, the lack of depth of the local debt
markets has meant that liquidity and pricing issues can arise, depending on the
size of the programme.  However, the introduction of the 2% approved issuer
levy, coupled with the depth of the FX swap market, has meant that
programmes can now be funded offshore on a cost efficient basis.
The second constraint relates to the availability of securitisable asset pools.
Most of the traditional assets, particularly residential mortgages and finance
receivables, that have not already been securitised are locked up in the trading
banks (and their finance subsidiaries).  There does not appear to be any
present need (either from a balance sheet or competitive perspective) for the
banks to securitise these assets themselves.  The growth in securitisation
activity, therefore, is expected to come from non-traditional assets, such as
property or other capital and infrastructure assets.
There is also a range of structural issues that require unique treatment in New
Zealand because of idiosyncrasies in our financial infrastructure.  These issues
relate to designing mechanisms for achieving insolvency remoteness,
techniques for avoiding application of the Chattels Transfer Act 1924, and rules
for achieving de-recognition under New Zealand GAAP.  Such technical issues
are beyond the scope of this paper.  The surge of securitisation transactions in
New Zealand in recent years is evidence enough that New Zealand's financial
infrastructure does not create undue barriers to securitisation.12
6  Can Liabilities be Securitised?
While much of the previous discussion has focussed on the securitisation of
assets, securitisation techniques can also be used to make implicit liabilities
4
more explicit.  For example, securitisation has been used by governments as a
means of addressing expenditure arrears problems [Ramos (1998)].
On occasions, governments have unilaterally borrowed from taxpayers,
superannuitants, public servants, welfare beneficiaries, and the suppliers of
goods and services by running into payment arrears.  When governments have
expenditure arrears, agents end up with implicit claims on the government for
which they have no title and which will be honoured, at best, at some
unspecified future date and for an uncertain amount.  Having no title to their
claim seriously limits creditors' financial management capacity, since they
cannot trade or enforce their claims.
In the past securitisation has been used as a means of formalising these implicit
debt obligations providing a degree of certainty to creditors and enhancing fiscal
credibility (eg, Argentina's issuance of bearer consolidation bonds (BOCONs) to
creditors in 1991).  Securitisation of implicit debts also enables marketability,
which can improve creditors' welfare by allowing them to reallocate their
resources in an equitable, transparent, and efficient manner.
                                           
4 Implicit liabilities are obligations not backed by a contractual agreement.13
7  Securitisation as a Public Policy Tool
The main benefits from asset securitisation are more efficient financing,
improved balance sheet structure, and better risk management.  Securitisation
has been used to enhance sovereign credibility.  Scope may exist for New
Zealand governments to achieve similar benefits, although the trade-off
between costs and benefits is likely to be a matter of judgement rather than an
outcome from quantitative analysis
5.
7.1  More Efficient Financing
One of the main advantages that can arise in the private sector when assets are
securitised is a reduction in the originator's cost of funds.  It is difficult to
envisage similar benefits for the Crown since, in most cases, the financing costs
of the SPV are expected to be greater than the Crown's overall cost of capital.
Essentially, the Government's power to tax its citizens provides the Crown with
low borrowing costs since creditors face little risk of default
6.  Even with a high
degree of credit enhancement, investors in securitisation vehicles still face
some risk that the securitised assets will fail to perform.
A possible exception where securitisation might be an efficient form of Crown
finance would be if the country had high and increasing levels of external debt.
In such circumstances, the Crown would have a low credit rating and its
borrowing capacity may be compromised
7.  It is conceivable that during a period
of fiscal stress certain Crown assets (eg, student loans) could be securitised
(and financed "off balance sheet") at a cheaper cost than the interest rate on
Crown borrowings.
Another issue to consider is whether the deadweight costs of taxation should be
quantified and factored into an assessment of the costs of securitisation.  It
could be argued, for example, that the capital released as a result of a
securitisation transaction could be used to fund tax cuts, which would have a
flow on affect in terms of lowering the economic costs that taxes impose on the
economy.  This argument hinges on whether a securitisation transaction
provides net fiscal savings, for example, due to improved asset management.
Conceivably, securitisation could detract from economic efficiency if any capital
released is used for unproductive purposes or to finance unsustainable tax cuts.
                                           
5 A combination of diverse government activities, concerns with equity as well as efficiency, and
information problems prevent a purely quantitative approach to cost/benefit analysis.
6 Since governments require permanent access to capital markets and usually have some form
of floating rate debt, they cannot escape punishment if they default.
7 This is not dissimilar to the financial situations observed in Argentina in 1991, in Russia in
1997/98, and in some South-East Asian countries during 1998/99.14
7.2  Improved Balance Sheet Structure
In the private sector, securitisation is used to manipulate balance sheets, for
example by improving gearing and profitability ratios.  Such activity is often
structured to comply with regulations, such as the need to meet capital
adequacy requirements.  The Crown does not face the same regulatory
pressures, although its balance sheet structure is influenced by the Fiscal
Responsibility Act 1994 and the Government's published fiscal targets.
One potential benefit for the Crown is the use of securitisation to release large
amounts of capital.  In this sense, securitisation provides the Government with
additional means of achieving its published debt targets
8.  This additional
flexibility is not necessarily good from an economic perspective since
securitisation is expected to be a relatively inefficient form of Crown financing in
most fiscal circumstances.
7.3  Better Risk Management
Securitisation is fundamentally a risk management tool.  It enables corporations
to separate commercial and business risks from the risks associated with
financing their operations.  In terms of financing risks, securitisation enables
private sector companies to shed funding risk, by making new sources of
funding available, as well as reducing interest rate and foreign exchange risk.
Securitisation has also enabled some organisations, particularly banks, to
remove impaired assets from their balance sheets.  Again, this is often done in
the case of insolvency or to meet capital adequacy requirements.
In the Crown context, risk management is typically undertaken to improve the
strength of the Crown's overall financial position, thereby limiting the need to
raise tax rates in response to various economic shocks.  However, the multitude
and diversity of financial exposures that affect the Crown's balance sheet make
it difficult to identify and quantify the risk management benefits of securitisation.
Such issues are closely tied to the Government's fiscal policy and the size of the
buffer required to maintain fiscal credibility.
It has been suggested that securitisation of student loans might generate risk
management benefits for the Crown
9.  This is because the value of loans
outstanding is expected to reach $19 billion by 2024 (at which time it will
represent a substantial component of the Crown's entire balance sheet).  It will
be important, for example, to establish whether differences between the interest
rate setting formula and the Crown's borrowing program create an interest rate
mismatch for the Crown and, if so, how this should be managed.
                                           
8 Alternatively, the Government could choose to use the proceeds of securitisation to increase
investment without raising taxes or resorting to additional borrowing.
9 A fuller discussion of the costs and benefits of securitising student loans is attached as an
appendix to this paper.15
Securitisation may also be beneficial if it results in an improved credit rating for
the Crown. A higher Crown credit rating can generate positive externalities for
the economy as a whole, since the Crown's credit rating represents a ceiling for
the credit ratings of New Zealand companies.
7.4  Enhanced Fiscal Credibility
Securitisation of implicit debt obligations (ie, obligations not backed by a
contractual agreement) has the potential to enhance fiscal credibility by
increasing transparency, signalling the government's commitment to honour its
obligations, and allowing the transfer of legal title.  Since market mechanisms
enable the punishment of governments who default on their debt obligations,
reneging on policy commitments becomes costly and represents a binding
constraint on the government.
The IMF argues that such arrangements are credible since default on these
securities will be as damaging to internal and external credibility as defaulting
on any other transparent claim.  They argue that the need to maintain credibility
in financial markets provides governments with major incentives to increase
transparency in their financial dealings.
Of course, a pre-requisite for enhanced credibility is fiscal affordability. In public
finance parlance, the Intertemporal Budget Constraint must be satisfied.
Without this, the securitised debt may be perceived as Junk resulting in a steep
discount in the secondary market.  Securitisation has been used successfully in
the past to enhance fiscal credibility where governments have fallen into
expenditure arrears.
Securitisation of public financial assets might also help fiscal credibility.  For
example, one option open to the Crown to help manage its future demographic
expenditure pressures is to pre-fund (by running surpluses and building up
financial assets).  In order to achieve a credible pre-funding policy, it will be
necessary to protect these assets from political mismanagement.  One way of
achieving this may be to securitise the assets, and to have the SPV issue
securities to the Crown with a payoff profile that mirrors the demographic
expenditure profile.  However, securitisation of future expenditures in areas
such as superannuation and health would raise serious policy and design
issues.16
8  Summary and Conclusion
Securitisation techniques have a number of potential public policy uses.  These
include more efficient financing, improved balance sheet structure, better risk
management and improved fiscal credibility.  However, two factors limit the
extent to which these advantages are achievable.
First, the sovereign power to tax provides the Crown with low borrowing costs
that, under most foreseeable fiscal circumstances, make securitisation a
relatively expensive financing option.  Second, the multitude and diversity of
financial exposures that affect the Crown's balance sheet make it difficulty to
quantify the risk management benefits of securitisation.
There is scope for the use of securitisation to enhancing fiscal credibility,
particularly in the area of superannuation where sustainability and policy
credibility are crucial determinants of a successful policy.  A pre-requisite for
successful securitisation of the government's pension liabilities will be a fiscally
sustainable expenditure profile and efficient management of any supporting
assets.17
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APPENDIX ONE
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF SECURITISING STUDENT LOANS
Introduction
A number of financial institutions have approached the Crown with proposals to
securitise the student loans portfolio.  The proposals are generally based on the
premise that the loans scheme performs both commercial roles (ie, the
provision of the loans themselves) and social roles (ie, concessionary interest
rates, non-commercial origination criteria, and income-contingent repayment
rules) and that these roles can be separated and managed individually.
Most proposals maintain that the commercial risks would be better managed in
the private sector but that the Crown should continue to retain the social risks
implicit in the student loans scheme.  This paper assesses the costs and
benefits associated with securitising student loans.
Structural Issues
While the proposals vary in terms of specific structural features, most are
consistent with the following generic diagram:
1  Borrowing Relationship
The relationship between the Crown and the students would be maintained.
The Crown would retain the right to determine scheme parameters, such as the
interest rate setting mechanism, the repayment rules, and the write-off
provisions.  The primary interface with borrowers would also be maintained,
with both the Student Loan Accounts Manager (SLAM) and the Inland Revenue
Department (IRD) retaining their existing administrative functions.  These























2  Sale of Loans
The Crown would sell loans to a bankruptcy remote SPV.   Credit enhancement,
loan selection criteria, and transfer pricing would be used to ensure that the
transaction remains attractive to investors.
Legal agreements would delineate the rights and obligations of all parties,
including the appointment of IRD as the collection agent.  The Crown would be
required to compensate the SPV for providing concessions to borrowers
(including the costs necessary to hedge risks created by the non-commercial
features).  Elements of the scheme likely to require compensation include
10:
·  The effective interest rate subsidy;
·  The interest rate risk created by differences in the reset frequency of the
loans (annually) and the term of reference rate (10-year government
bonds);
·  Principal write-off upon death of a borrower; and
·  Base interest write-offs, when the borrower's annual repayments do not
cover the annual real interest charge on the debt.
Changes to scheme parameters, resulting from changes in Government policy,
could be accommodated by entering into new or varied social cost transfer
arrangements.  Independent expert advice would be sought to ensure that the
compensation arrangements were fair to all parties involved.
3  Debt Financing
The SPV would finance the purchase of the loans by issuing rated debt
securities into the capital markets.  To ensure efficient risk-sharing, the
securities would be structured to reflect the long duration and uncertain
repayment characteristics of the loans.  Depending on the risk appetite of
investors, the SPV could either issue "pass-through" bonds, thereby transferring
the repayment risk directly to investors, or it could issue multiple tranches of
debt, each with different maturity characteristics, designed to reflect the
expected repayment profile.
A dual issuance into both domestic and offshore markets would be required
because of the limited size of the domestic debt market and the large size of the
loans portfolio.  To the extent that there is greater demand for the SPV’s debt
from offshore, issuing into offshore markets is likely to reduce the cost of
                                           
10 The other social features, such as the non-commercial origination criteria and the long-term
income-contingent nature of the loans, could be addressed within the structure of the SPV
without requiring direct compensation by the Crown.20
securitisation to the Crown. The Crown would not guarantee the debt issued by
the SPV.
4  Credit Enhancement
To ensure an adequate credit rating for the SPV's debt, the Crown and other
third parties will be required to provide credit enhancement.  Factors affecting
the level of credit enhancement include:
·  The price paid for loans by the SPV
·  The risk of the portfolio, which is a function of:
ã  the non-commercial origination criteria;
ã  the income-contingent repayment rules;
ã  the SPV's loan selection criteria;
ã  the strong collection mechanism, being compulsory deductions via
IRD; and
ã  the difficulty in collecting repayments from borrowers residing
offshore
·  The requirement for a strong credit rating to enable the issuance of large
volumes of securities at an adequate cost-of-funds.
Most proposals would have the Crown providing "first loss" credit enhancement
(generally capped at a fixed percentage of the portfolio value). This could take
the form of a loan loss insurance facility, letter of credit, or subordinated debt.
The "first loss" support would reflect both the special credit characteristics of the
loans and the normal credit risk of the loans.  Alternatively, a portion of the "first
loss" support could be provided by third parties (eg, banks and monoline
insurers) for an appropriate price
11.
Third parties would provide "second loss" credit enhancement sufficient to
achieve the desired credit rating of the securities.  This would probably be in the
form of subordinated debt securities that could be sold to investors seeking
higher yields.  This "senior/subordinated" structure allows more efficient risk-
sharing by parcelling up different types of risk and marketing it to those most
willing to bear it.
                                           
11 The cost of externally sourced credit enhancement would ultimately be borne by the Crown
through the compensation arrangements agreed between the Crown and the SPV.21
5  Liquidity Support
Liquidity support would be provided to the SPV to assist it in managing any
cash flow timing differences that may arise.  This is usually provided by a
financial institution and is expected to represent only a very small percentage of
the total quantum of securities issued.
Benefit Assessment
A number of arguments have been put forward in support of securitisation:
·  Enables debt reduction;
·  Reduces balance sheet exposure;
·  Results in divestment of commercial activity;
·  Improves transparency;
·  Protects the sovereign credit rating;
·  Enhances political flexibility; and
·  Continuity of origination, collection and servicing functions.
Of these, the potential risk management benefits and the consequent release of
capital (assuming it is used more productively) discussed in Section Two, are
the most compelling.  Some of the potential benefits, such as improved
transparency, are merely by-products of the securitisation process and could be
achieved through other means.
The following paragraphs comment on the proposed benefits in greater detail.
Where relevant, outstanding issues have been highlighted and questions raised
to prompt further discussion.  The discussion has been ordered from the least
compelling reasons for securitisation to the more convincing.  Some of the
arguments have been grouped for reasons of brevity.
Transparency and Continuity
The benefits of transparency and continuity, while not disputed, are not
considered in this paper since these two objectives are achievable through
other means.  However, to the extent that securitisation is considered beneficial
for other reasons, the benefits of transparency and continuity should not be
overlooked.22
Divestment of Commercial Activity
Divestment of commercial activity is a means of enhancing economic efficiency
rather than an end in itself.  The gains from divesting Crown commercial assets
arise from improved managerial decisions, better incentives and stronger
accountabilities, rather than from a reduction in commercial risk or the release
of capital for debt repayment.
The student loans portfolio is less susceptible to mismanagement than other
Crown commercial activities, since managerial discretion regarding the loans
portfolio is limited and the scheme parameters are clearly specified in
legislation. As such, I expect the efficiency gains from securitisation to be
relatively minor.
Protection of Sovereign Credit Rating
The Crown should only be concerned with its credit rating to the extent that it
impacts on social welfare, for example, through a strong link between the
Crown's credit rating and the cost of borrowing within an economy.  Assuming
that the Crown's credit rating is currently below that required to maximise
welfare, securitisation of student loans may be beneficial if it results in an
improved credit rating.  Without supporting evidence, a number of "leaps of
faith" are required to conclude that securitisation is beneficial on these grounds.
However, I am sympathetic to this line of reasoning, particularly in light of the
growth that is projected in the loans portfolio over the medium term.  The
Crown's credit rating is closely linked to perceptions of fiscal sustainability and
Crown risk more generally.  I consider that this is an avenue for further work.
Debt Reduction
Securitisation of student loans would release a large amount of capital for other
uses.  At issue is whether those other uses represent more productive uses of
capital once the costs of securitisation are taken into account.
The Government currently has a policy of reducing both gross and net debt.  In
addition, the proceeds of asset sales are typically earmarked for debt
repayment.  However, as discussed earlier, releasing capital is not the primary
motivation for selling Crown-owned businesses.  Rather, having made the
decision to sell an asset on efficiency grounds, debt repayment has been
considered to be the most appropriate use of the free cash flow created.  Other
potential uses of free cash flow include tax cuts and increased public
expenditure.23
In most circumstances, the costs to the Crown of securitisation can be expected
to be greater than the Crown's overall cost of capital
12.  As long as this remains
true, at the margin, it is difficult to envisage significant benefits from using the
proceeds of securitisation to finance debt reduction.  It is also difficult to assess
the relative benefits of other options, such as tax cuts, without further detailed
analysis.
Reducing Balance Sheet Exposure
The value of outstanding loans is expected to reach $19 billion by 2024.  At this
level, the portfolio is expected to dominate the Crown's balance sheet (under
current policy settings) and the issue of risk management will become more
important.  For example, it will be important to determine whether the interest
rate setting mechanism exposes the Crown to an interest rate mismatch and, if
so, whether that should be actively managed or not.  Similar questions should
be asked about the degree of credit risk exposure faced by the Crown.
So far little has been done to quantify and assess the Crown's actual risk
exposure to the student loans portfolio.  While I accept that there are potentially
significant benefits to the Crown from improved risk management, I would
require additional information (and, if possible, quantification) on the nature of
those benefits and on the costs of securitisation, before I could make a
judgement on the merits of securitisation.
It would also be surprising if securitisation was the only means of managing
these exposures.  Interest rate swaps and credit risk options, for example, may
also be useful tools for achieving the desired levels of interest rate and credit
risk.  Other options would be unlikely to result in de-recognition of the loans.
The risk management benefits of securitisation will need to be assessed against
other risk management techniques.
Assessment of Potential Disadvantages
·  Releasing Capital for Unproductive Uses
Although debt repayment may present little scope for financial mismanagement,
there remains scope for efficiency losses if the cash is used for other purposes.
In this sense, the Crown's holding of a relatively non-fungible loan asset may be
preferred to a highly fungible cash asset, particularly if the loans are reported as
part of net debt.
·  Increased Cost of Funds
Tentative indications of the operating costs of securitisation have been provided
by a number of financial institutions.  These costs range from 50 to 150 basis
                                           
12 A possible exception would be if the Crown's credit rating was substantially lower, or if
securitisation was perceived favourably by the financial markets.24
points above the Crown's cost of borrowing and do not include the cost of
providing credit enhancement.  The risk management and other benefits from
securitisation would need to be significant to outweigh the increase in the
Crown's cost of funds.
Overseas Student Loan Securitisations
It is worthwhile considering the reasons for securitisation of student loans in
other jurisdictions, notably the UK and the US, and whether similar
circumstances apply in New Zealand.
United Kingdom
In March 1998, the UK Government successfully completed a securitisation of
$1.0 billion of student loans.  The transaction involved the issuance of pass-
through bonds in six tranches.  The UK Government provided first loss credit
protection for student loan defaults, in the form of cover for loans which have
been in arrears for over 24 months, up to a maximum of 4.75% of the portfolio.
A further proposed transaction was announced in June 1998.
The transaction was motivated by a "manifesto pledge" to stay within the UK
Government's published spending plans.  The Government indicated that it was
keen to transfer the default risk associated with the unsecured loans to the
private sector, arguing that the private sector is better placed to manage that
risk.  The Government also argued that securitisation will enable markets to
develop a better understanding of the student loan product, possibly permitting
a greater role for private sector financing in the future [Department for
Education and Employment Press Release, 1998].
The scheme parameters, such as deferment rights, the interest rate setting
mechanism, and the repayment terms, were fixed upon settlement and cannot
be changed unilaterally by the purchaser, the administrator, or the government
without violating the terms of the agreement.  The securitised loans were not
income-contingent and the government has announced that it has no intention
of selling the income-contingent loans [Student Loan Debt Sale - Question's and
Answers, 1998].
The concessionary nature of the schemes means that the UK Government will
have to pay additional subsidies to the purchaser.  The present value of these
subsidies is in the order of $350 million, compared with an estimated cost of
$300 million if the loans had remained in public ownership.  This represents an
increase in cost of almost 17 per cent.
It was previously identified that potential improvements in risk management
were likely to be the most compelling argument for securitisation of student
loans.  Risk management benefits were certainly claimed in the UK case,
however, fiscal constraints also appeared to be a significant factor.25
United States
The US environment is considerably different than New Zealand.  In the US,
funding of student loans is typically provided by private institutions, albeit in a
regulated environment, at rates that are less concessionary than the New
Zealand scheme.  Many of these loans are then purchased by Sallie Mae, a
government-sponsored financing intermediary.  The loans are usually
guaranteed by the Department of Education.
Until recently, Sallie Mae has been financing loan purchases by issuing debt to
the Federal Financing Bank.  A constraint on this source of funds, in 1996 and
1997, caused Sallie Mae to complete four securitisations involving USD 15.4
billion of student loans.
Two elements of the US environment are sufficiently different to prevent direct
comparisons with the New Zealand situation.  First, loan finance is privately
provided, and so the additional costs of securitisation are unlikely to be as
significant because of the narrower spread between the funding rates of the
loan originator and the SPV. Second, the loans are provided at less
concessionary rates, so the financial costs to the government of the social goals
of the scheme are much smaller.
Summary
While the various securitisation proposals appear to be feasible, it is not clear
from a cursory analysis that the benefits would exceed the costs.  Indeed, the
benefits would have to be quite significant given the additional costs associated
with securitisation relative to other forms of Crown finance.